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ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN VERTICAL AND 

HORIZONTAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION: AN 

APPLICATION TO BANKING* 

We  study the conditions under which banks offer remote access. Note there 
exists interaction  between  location and  taste for remote  access. Offering 
remote access is an instnunent to (partially) segment depositors according to 
their taste for that technology. The interaction between location and taste for 
remote access enhances this effect. Different equilibria emerge as the result 
of two  effects. First, introducing remote access steals depositors fiom the 
opponent  as the product  specification becomes  more  appealing. Second, 
deposit  rate  competition  is  affected  as  remote  access  determines  the 
substitutability of banks. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
DEVELOPMENTS in technology have a powerful impact on the mode of delivering 
financial  services.  Remote  access  services  (postal  and  telephonic  delivery 
systems) become  more  important.  Many  customers rely  heavily  on  manual 
telephone and postal liaison with their bank in order to arrange payment facilities 
and obtain account information. Remote access offers depositors the possibility to 
process financial transactions without visiting a bank's  branch. In addition, it 
enables them to perform transactions outside and to evade queues within office 
hours. This evolution in banking is likely to continue. Anne Perlman writes in The 
Banker [January 1995, p. 671; "Emst & Young, a leading financial analyst in the 
US, has carried out a survey of technology in banlung. It projects that bank 
transactions at traditional 'brick and mortar' branches will drop fiom 61% to 44% 
by  1997, replaced by  non-branch transactions conducted over a digital media 
network."  Remote access  facilities came  into  operation in  several countries. 
According to  BIS  [I9931 and BEUC  [1992], virtually all major banks  offer 
remote access services such as home-  and phonebanking in Belgium, France, 
Germany, Sweden and the UK. Remote access is less available in Italy, Ireland and 
the Netherlands. This paper  studies the impact  of the introduction of remote 
access, improving  the  accessibility of  funds,  on banking  competition. More 
specifically, we analyze how the strength of competition between banks influences 
the  decision  to  introduce  these  new  communication technologies.  We  also 
consider the impact of these technologies on intermediation margins. 
*The author thanks Jean-Paul  Abraham,  Marcel Canoy,  Mathias Dewatripont, Lany  Goldberg, 
Patrick Van  Cayseele, Frank  Verboven, two  anonymous referees, and editor Michael Waterson  for 
their suggestions. Financial assistance from the EC-Human Capital and Mobility Program is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
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Competition in banking was  until recently regarded with  suspicion. It would 
induce too much risk taking and generate financial instability (Mayer and Vives 
[1993]). Deregulation and  European  integration,  however,  induced banks  to 
compete for  deposits using  several  dimensions. These  include deposit rates, 
accessibility and the quality of financial services. This paper examines multi- 
dimensional banking competition. Financial products, in the model developed in 
the paper, are characterized by  one feature of variety (location) and one feature 
of  quality  (remote access). The  novelty  of  this model  is  that  banks  cannot 
become  vertically  differentiated  without  negatively  affecting  the  degree  of 
horizontal differentiation between them. 
In  the  trahtional  one-dimensional  product  differentiation  literature,  two 
models prevail, namely horizontal (Hotelling [1929]) and vertical (Gabszewicz 
and  Thlsse  119791,  Shaked and  Sutton  [1982]) differentiation. Products  are 
horizontally  differentiated  when  there  is  no  consensus  of  ranking  among 
consumers based  on their willingness-to-pay.  Products are vertically differen-
tiated when there is such a ranking at equal prices. However, most products 
embody more than one characteristic and both types of differentiation. In  the 
recent  literature (Neven and  Thisse  [1990], Caplin and Nalebuff  [I9911 and 
Anderson et al.  [1992]), those one-dimensional models are extended towards 
multi-dimensional product differentiation. Some papers analyze product speci- 
fications in two characteristics (Neven and Thisse [1990], Economides [I9891 
and [1993], Tabuchi [1994]). In those papers, both characteristics are assumed to 
be independent. Our paper differs by having negative interaction between types 
of characteristics. 
Financial products such as deposit accounts embody several characteristics, 
both horizontal and vertical. Horizontal differentiation arises with the location of 
a bank's branch. Vertical differentiation, in this paper, occurs whenever one bank 
offers remote access and the other does not. Remote access, in addition, implies 
a  negative  interaction1 between  transportation  rate  and  taste  for  quality: 
depositors with  a  higher  taste  for remote  access face  a  lower  transportation 
rate if that technology is available. In other words, the introduction of vertical 
differentiation  between  banks  negatively  affects  the  degree  of  horizontal 
differentiation between them. 
Competition  is  modelled  as  a  two-stage  game.  In  the  first  stage  banks 
simultaneously choose whether they will  offer remote  access or not.  In  the 
second stage, they compete in deposit rates. Within the subgame where only one 
bank offers remote access, two mutually exclusive cases exist. First, horizontal 
dominance2 arises when banks attract a positive market share for all  types of 
'The computer sector delivers another example of interaction between characteristics. Some stores 
sell their products with the opportunity to receive phone support while others not. Clumsy computer 
users located further away from the store value phone support more than their clumsy colleagues at a 
shorter distance. 
'This  terminology was first used by Nwen and Thisse [1990]. The terminology, however, does not 
coincide perfectly as they use it in a model without interaction term. 
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taste for remote access. This occurs whenever the transportation rate overwhelms 
the quality difference and the interaction term. Second, vertical dominance arises 
when  the  bank  (not)  offering  remote  access  obtains  the  entire  market  for 
depositors characterised by  the highest (lowest) taste  for remote access.  This 
occus  if  the  quality  difference  and  the  interaction  term  overwhelm  the 
transportation rate. A model where depositors face different linear transportation 
costs arises as both banks offer remote access. A depositor with a high (low) 
taste for remote access has low (high) linear transportation costs. 
Different  equilibria emerge as the result of two effects. On the one hand, 
introducing remote access  steals depositors from your opponent because the 
product specification becomes more appealing (direct effect). On the other hand, 
banks become closer  substitutes (indirect effect).  First, banks become closer 
substitutes as the impact of linear transportation costs decreases. Second, deposit 
rate  competition is  affected  by  the  size of  the  quality difference. These two 
effects,  "stealing"  depositors versus  "substitutability"  between  banks,  deter- 
mines the equilibrium. For low and high values of the ratio quality difference to 
transportation  rate,  only  one  bank  offers  remote  access  (specialization). 
Intermediate (very low) values of the ratio quality difference to transportation 
costs yield universal (no) remote access. 
A closely related paper in the banking competition literature is Matutues and 
Padilla  [1994].  They  discuss  the  effects  of  ATM  compatibility on  banking 
competition.  The  similarities  are  the  following.  We  both  investigate  and 
introduce  non-price  competition  elements  in  banking  competition.  In  both 
papers, banks cannot introduce new  payment technologies without negatively 
affecting horizontal  differentiation. Our paper,  however, presents several dis- 
tinctive features. First, in our model, depositors di#m  in  their marginal will- 
ingness-to-pay  for the new  payment technology.  This implies that banks face 
extra incentives to differentiate themselves in the quality range. Second, related 
to the first, the degree of negative interaction between the horizontal and vertical 
characteristic differs among depositors. In other words, the negative effect on 
horizontal differentiation of becoming vertically differentiated is partly counter- 
balanced as one attracts the depositors with a high taste for remote access more 
easily. Third, each bank individually decides whether to introduce remote access 
or not. In Matutes and Padilla [1994], banks propose compatibility agreements. 
Therefore, a  compatibility decision  is  taken  by  at  least two  banks.  Another 
related paper is Bouckaert and Degryse [I9951 who discuss phonebanking. In 
that model, all depositors have the same taste for using the phone option. In our 
model, depositors dzfler in taste for remote access. Heterogeneity in tastes arise 
as the frequency of using that technology differs. For instance, businesses face 
different needs for payment  services than individuals. Therefore, the taste for 
remote access depends on the type  of  depositor.  Finally, Matutes and  Vives 
[I9921 present a model where banks differ with respect to location and perceived 
failure probability (reputation). Vertical and horizontal differentiation are unre- 
lated, and all depositors have the same willingness-to-pay for reputation. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section I1 proposes a multi-dimensional 
banking competition model. Section I11 discusses the second stage deposit rate 
equlibriurn while section IV focuses on the first stage product choice. Section V 
presents some concluding remarks. 
11.  THE MODEL 
Consider a duopolistic deposit market. Competition for deposits is modelled as a 
two-stage game. At stage one, both banks simultaneously decide to offer remote 
access (T)or not (N). Introducing this technology is costless. In the second stage, 
they simultaneously choose deposit rates. Banks A and B are located on a circle 
with a circumference of 1 denoted by C.  Their location is exogeneous given at 
respectively  0  and  lj2. Therefore, the focus is on the introduction of quality 
variation and interaction between taste for quality and location. Deposit accounts 
with the associated services are defined by two characteristics. First, the location 
of a bank determines the physical access. Second, remote access may or may not 
be available. Banks invest the proceedings of their deposits and obtain an idential 
rate of return R per unit of money. They maximize the following profit function 
with R =  rate of return obtained by banks 
ri =  deposit rate of bank i 
D =  amount of deposits attracted by bank i. 
Each depositor invests one unit  of money at one of the two banks.3 They 
perform one normalized financial transaction. Depositors have two character- 
istics. First, each depositor has a unique location z on C.  Second, they have a 
taste  for  remote  access  8  with  8 E @,a]. Remote  access  (T) implies  that 
depositors can manage a  fraction of their financial transaction remotely. If  a 
bank decides not to offer remote access (N), all transactions need a visit to that 
bank.  A  depositor uses  remote  access,  if  available, for  a  fraction  8  of  the 
normalized financial transaction. The fraction 8 can be interpreted as the fraction 
of account management transactions. The complement 1-8 represents the fraction 
of cash withdrawals. The latter clearly need  a visit to the branch. Depositors 
differ with respect to 8, but they all prefer remote access at the same deposit 
rate.4 For  instance, depositors vary in their payment behaviour.  The taste for 
remote access 8 and the location z are assumed to be non contractible: deposit 
rates cannot be made conditional either on the taste for remote  access or on 
location. As shown in Figure 1, the space of depositor's characteristics (z,B) is the 
cylinder C x  @,  815 (Econornides [1993]). Depositors are uniformly distributed 
or instance, shopping costs explain why depositors choose only one bank  (Klernperer  [1992]). 
4Alternatively, depositors can differ in the number of transactions. 
'Opening  up  this  cylindrical  space yields two  rectangles, [O, 0.51 x (8, 81  and  [0.5, 11 x (8, 
respectively. 
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A 
Figure  1 

Depositors distributed on a cylinder 

with density 1  /[8 - 8] over the surface of the cylinder, so that their total mass is 
equal to one. 
Using remote access has two effects. On the one hand, it implies a fixed cost z 
per  transaction,  for  instance  the  cost  of  a  phone  call.  On  the  other  hand, 
depositors  save  transaction  costs.  Firstly,  they  avoid  the  waiting  cost  k. 
Secondly, they save the linear transportation rate t times the distance between 
the bank and their location. Then, according to the presence of remote access or 
not, depositors have the following value for a deposit account: 
where N =remote access not 
T =remote access offered 
8 =fraction of financial transactions executed by remote access, if offered 
ri =deposit rate at bank i(i =A, B) 
z =distance between depositor's location and bank 
t =linear transportation cost 
k =expected cost of waiting at a bank desk 
z =fixed cost of using remote access 
v =reservation value large enough such that the market is covered 
This model  encompasses the vertical and horizontal differentiation models.  If 
remote access is not offered (N), all financial transactions need a physical visit to 
the bank.  The quality offered equals zero. Therefore,  the  depositor's  value  is 
independent of 8. The latter no longer holds when remote access (T) is offered. 
The term in square brackets in  V)T,z, 8) represents the gain in fixed costs of 
using remote access (define k - z =n.This term  is common  in  the vertical 
differentiation literature (see e.g. Gabszewicz and Thisse [1979], Tirole [1988]): 
0Blackwell Publ~shem  Lid  1996 174  HANS DEGRYSE 
8 represents the taste for quality while f(= k - z)  describes the quality of the 
good. The last term in V(t, z, 8) implies non-separability in taste for quality and 
distance. There is negative interaction between transportation rate and taste for 
quality: depositors with a higher 8 face lower transportation costs. We  expect the 
quality difference f to be high in  securities and trading transactions. Speed in 
these  markets  is  very  important  as  opportunities  are  often  short-lived. The 
quality difference is smaller for ordinary retail transactions. 
Given the first stage decision about the choice of remote access, three types of 
subgames occur: both banks do not offer remote access (N,,  Nb), one bank offers 
remote access (T,,  Nb)  or both banks offer remote access (T,,  Tb). 
III(i)  Subgame (N,,  Nb) 
According to (I), the indifferent depositor is located such that 
with x(8) =market  share of bank A for type 8. 
Banks are undifferentiated along the remote access dimension. This subgame 
is a standard model of product differentiation with linear transportation costs t 
yielding the following deposit rate equilibrium: 
III(ii)  Subgame (T,,  Tb) 
According to (I), bank A's  market share for type 8 equals 
Banks are undifferentiated along the remote access dimension. Notice that A's 
market share is a function of 8 due to the interaction term.6 The demand function 
is derived in Appendix 1. 
In this subgame, depositors face different linear transportation costs. These are 
uniformly distributed over a continuum [t(l -a),t(l -a].Depositors with  a 
high (low) taste for remote access face low (high) transportation costs due to the 
interaction term. This situation is similar to Garella and Martinez-Giralt [1993]. 
There, by assumption, consumers are uniformly distributed in the space of linear 
transportation costs. 
We  end up  in a situation like the (N,, Nb) case in the absence of the interaction term. 
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The  equilibrium  interest  rate  if  8 < 0.965  equals  f = 
R -t(8 -8)/2ln[(l -8)/(1 -8)] with Dz =  Dg  = 1/2 (for the derivation, see 
Appendix 2). 
In the absence of the interaction term, profits and equilibrium deposit rates are 
the  same  as  in  subgame  (N,,  Nb).  The  interaction  term  generates  higher 
equilibrium deposit rates and lower profits. Therefore, competition is sharpened 
vis-a-vis the (N,,  Nb) case. 
III(iii)  Subgame (T,,  Nb) 
Given  (I), the  set of depositors indifferent between  bank  A  offering remote 
access and  bank  B  not  offering  remote  access  are derived. For  any  set of 
depositors 8 E [8,8],the marginal one is located such that 
with f =  k - z. 
Banks are differentiated along the remote access dimension. Therefore, the x-
curve depends on the quality difference fbetween both banks. In addition, the x-
curve depends on the taste for remote access 8. It is non-linear in 8 due to the 
interaction term. The demand function is derived in Appendix 3. The demand 
function consists of a convex, a linear, and a concave segment. In this subgame, 
profit functions are quasi-concave. Therefore, there is a unique equilibrium. 
Two  mutually  exclusive cases  occur  namely  vertical  and  horizontal  dom- 
inance. The vertical dominance case is depicted in Figure 2. 
Vertical dominance (VD) occurs when A  attracts the entire market for the 8 
types and has a zero market share for the 8 types. The reverse holds for bank B 
not offering remote access. This situation is referred to as vertical dominance as 
it is characterised by the dominance of the quality difference and the interaction 
term  over  transportation  rate.  A  necessary  condition  for  VD  is  f/t 2 
1  Market Area T  -
I'  CI  Market Area  N  I 
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[(2-8)/(2(8-@)I.'  VD is more likely if the heterogeneity in taste for remote 
access increases. Note the concave curvature in Figure 2. This results from the 
interaction term.  The  bank  offering remote  access attracts depositors with  a 
higher taste for remote access at an increasing rate. The equilibrium for VD is 
described in Proposition 1. 
Proposition  1  Consider  the  case  of  vertical  dominance  and  let  z = 
ln((2f +  t)/(2f)).The equilibrium interest rates, provided  they belong to the 
linear segment of the demand hction, are 
and 
Prooj  See Appendix 4. 
Note that r:d  < rid and D:~ 2  DId. We  can decompose the impact of remote 
access on profits in two effects. The first is a direct effect; that is the effect given 
that the other bank sets an interest rate as in the (N,, Nb) case. The direct effect 
when case VD prevails is positive and equals 
It is positive as remote access increases the attractibility of that bank. In other 
words, a bank becomes "closer" to depositors. The second is an indirect effect; 
that is the effect on profits of a change in the interest rate of the bank not offering 
remote access. It equals the difference between the equilibrium profits and the 
first  term  in  the previous  expression.  The  indirect  effect is positive  as  the 
intensity of price competition is decreased. Therefore, a bank should overinvest 
in remote access for strategic purposes. 
The horizontal dominance case is shown in Figure 3. 
Horizontal dominance (HD)  occurs when A attracts a strictly positive market 
share of the @ types while it does not serve the entire market for the 8 types. This 
case is characterised by the dominance of the transportation rate over the quality 
difference and the interaction term. 
A  necessary  condition for HD  is f/t < [(2-8)/(2(8- Q))]. HD  is more 
likely the lower the heterogeneity in taste for remote access. The Q types located 
at bank  A  prefer to deposit at that bank. The 8 types located at bank  B not 
In the absence of the interaction term, VD  would arise iff /t 3  1/(8 -B). Therefore, the region 
whereVD  prevails increases due to the negativeinteraction  between the taste for remote access and 
the transportation rate. 
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offering remote  access  prefer  to  hold  a  deposit  account  at  that  bank.  The 
equilibrium for horizontal dominance is described in Proposition 2. 
Proposition  2  Consider  the  case  of  horizontal  dominance  and  let 
q =  ln((2 -t?)/(2  -8)).  The  equilibrium interest rates, provided they belong 
to the linear segment of the demand function, are 
and 
Pro08  See Appendix 5. 
Note that ed< ddand ed >, gd. Again, we can decompose the effect on 
profits of introducing remote access in a direct and indirect effect. The former is 
positive and equals 
It is positive as offering remote access increases the attractibility of that bank. 
The latter is the difference between the equilibrium profits under HD  and the first 
term in the previous expression. The indirect effect is negative when case HD 
prevails.  In  other  words,  banks  should  underinvest  in  new  communication 
technologies in order to avoid an aggressive response of the competitor. 
We  discuss some important comparative statics before moving to the first stage 
product decision. The effect on profits of a change in the quality difference t on 
the bank not offering remote access is contingent on the type of dominance. 
More specifically, an increase in f  has a positive (negative) impact on the profits 
under vertical (horizontal) dominance. The reason is that this change decreases 
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(increases)  the  "number  of  marginal  depositors"  under  vertical  (horizontal) 
dominance. In other words, an increase in f positively (negatively) affects the 
incentives under horizontal  (vertical) dominance to compete for the marginal 
depositors. 
IV  PRODUCT DECISION-MAKING 
In the first stage of the game, banks simultaneously decide what product (remote 
access or not) they will offer. Three types of product equilibria occur: no remote 
access (Nu,  Nb),  specialization (T,,  Nb) or universal remote access (T,,  Tb). The 
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in pure strategies (SPNE) when HD prevails in 
subgame (T,,  Nb)  are presented in Proposition 3. 
Proposition 3  Let 
and 
Given that HD  is the unique  equilibrium in  subgame (T,,  Nb), the following 
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria occur (see Figure 4): 
a) no remote access in equilibrium iff  < g(t) (region I). 

b)  specialization in equilibrium if g(t) <f < E(t) (region II). 

c)  universal remote access in equilibrium if E(t) <f (region III) 

Prooj  See appendix 6. 
The case where VD prevails in subgame (T,, Ng) is presented in Proposition 4. 
Proposition 4  Given that VD is the unique equilibrium in subgame (T,,  Nb), 
the following equilibria occur (see Figure 4): 
a) no remote access is never an equilibrium. 
b)  universal remote access is  an equilibrium for lower values of the ratio f/t 
(region VII). 
c) specialization is an equilibrium for higher values of the ratio f/t (region 
WI). 
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Proox  See appendix 7. 
I:  no remote access 
I1  and VII: specialization 
III and VI: universal 
remote access 
f  lV and V:  ? 




Product decision (0 =0.6,d =0.2) 

Figure 4 illustrates propositions 3 and 4. The quality difference f is denoted on 
the  vertical  axis  and  the  transportation  rate  t  on  the  horizontal  axis.  The 
borderline between  regions N  and V represents the  separation between  HD 
and VD for subgame (T,,  Nb). 
A necessary condition for HD to prevail in subgame (T,,  Nb) is that (f,  t)is in 
regions  I,  11,  I11  or  IV:  The  functions g(t)  and  E(t) represent the  borderline 
between regions I and 11,  I1 and I11 respectively. If the ratio quality difference to 
transportation costs  is low  (region I),  neither bank  offers remote  access (no 
remote  access).  Offering  remote  access  makes  the  deposit  account  more 
appealing  (direct  effect).  Banks,  however,  become  much  closer  substitutes 
since the linear transportation costs are dominant (indirect effect). Therefore, 
banks do not offer remote access. For intermediate values of the ratio quality 
difference to transportation rate (region 11), exactly one bank8 introduces remote 
access (specialization). In  that region, the bank  offering remote access steals 
sufficient depositors  from  its  opponent  since the  quality  difference is more 
important. As specialization is the equilibrium outcome in region 11,  horizontal 
dominance occurs. Each bank attracts a positive market share for each 8 type. 
Offering remote  access implies that banks partially segment their clients: the 
bank offering remote access attracts a higher market share of the depositors with 
a high taste for remote access. An increase in the quality difference f implies that 
the  profits  of  the  bank  not  offering remote  access  decrease.  If  this  quality 
difference becomes sufficiently large, both banks offer remote access (universal 
*A  co-ordination problem arises as two prime strategy equilibria occur ((T,, Nb) and (N., Tb)). 
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remote  access) (region 111).  The bank  offering remote  access  steals a  lot  of 
depositors away from the opponent. This direct effect overwhelms the indirect 
effect of banks becoming closer substitutes. If universal remote access prevails, 
banks become less differentiated and competition is sharpened. The equilibrium 
is not on the linear segment of the demand function in region IV Therefore, we 
cannot investigate the overall SPNE for that region. 
A necessary condition for VD to prevail in subgame (T,, Nb)is that Cf, t)is in 
regions V, VI or VII. In region V, the equilibrium is not on the linear segment of 
the demand function. Therefore, we cannot investigate the overall SPNE for that 
region. The functions separating regions V, VI and VII are implicit in f  and t. No 
remote  access  is  never  a  SPNE.  Offering  remote  access  yields  a  higher 
intermediation margin as well as market share. Universal remote access is the 
unique equilibrium in region VI. Not offering remote access decreases substan- 
tially the  attractiveness of that  bank.  If this  decrease in  attractiveness is not 
compensated by  a  decrease in  substitutability, universal remote  access is the 
unique SPNE. Banks are less horizontally differentiated when universal remote 
access prevails. The profits of a bank not offering remote access in the (T,,  Nb) 
case are positively affected by an increase in f because this softens deposit rate 
competition. In other words, an increase in f  reduces the substitutability between 
banks.  Therefore,  specialization  arises  for  high  values  of  the  ratio  quality 
difference to  transportation  rate  (region VII).  In  that  region,  the  bank  (not) 
offering remote access attracts all high (low) taste for remote access types. 
The introduction of remote access by at least one bank becomes more likely 
the  lower  the  transportation  costs.  In  other  words,  the  attractiveness  of 
introducing  remote  access  increases  if  banlang  competition  is  already  very 
strong. 
Solving the game without the interaction term yields a different outcome. In 
the case where HD  prevails both banks introduce the technology.9 Banks steal 
depositors from their opponent. However, the substitutability is not affected as 
linear  transportation  costs  do  not  decrease.  Therefore,  a  different  outcome 
results.  If  VD  prevails,  the  region  where  specialization  occurs  decreases. 
Offering the technology has lower competitive effects as there is no negative 
effect on horizontal differentiation. 
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In  our  framework, the  disutility  of  the  transportation  rate  depends  on  the 
presence  of  remote  access.  This  explains  the  negative  interaction  between 
transportation  rate  and  taste  for  remote  access.  Therefore,  the  degree  of 
horizontal differentiation between banks is negatively affected by the introduc- 
tion of remote access. 
Without the interaction term, one cannot speak of remote access since depositors need to visit the 
bank: depositors only save waiting costs. 
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A range of equilibria emerge as the result of two effects. On the one hand, 
introducing remote  access  steals depositors  from your opponent because the 
product specification becomes more appealing (direct effect). On the other hand, 
remote  access  affects the  substitutability  of  banks  for  two  reasons (indirect 
effect). First, banks become closer substitutes as the impact of linear transporta- 
tion costs decreases. Second, deposit rate competition is affected by the size of 
the quality difference. For low and high values of the ratio quality difference to 
transportation  cost,  only  one  bank  offers  remote  access  (specialization). 
Intermediate (very low) values of the ratio quality difference to transportation 
costs yield universal (no) remote access. 
If specialization arises, offering remote access is an instrument to (partially) 
segment clients. Vertical  dominance occurs whenever the bank (not) offering 
remote access supplies the entire market of depositors with a high (low) taste for 
remote  access.  A  necessary  condition  is  that  the  ratio  quality difference to 
transportation  costs is  sufficiently large. Horizontal dominance occurs if that 
ratio is sufficiently low. Then, both banks serve part of all taste for remote access 
types. Under both types of dominance, the bank offering remote access pays a 
lower deposit rate and faces a higher demand. 
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Demand Function (To,Tb) 
Aggregate demand for bank  A is derived by  intergrating (3)  over [B, 81.  The demand 
function has five segments. 
D:  =o iff ra < rb -- t(l -8)- = Cin 
2 
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APPENDIX 2 
Demand Function (T, ,Nb) 
Aggregate demand is derived by integrating (4) over @, 81.  The demand hnction has five 
segments. The shape of the third segment depends on the slope of (4) 
1  [-2ra -20  +  t +  4f) 
ln(2ra Z:i?+-
- -
6-a  t  4f) 
-
if r,m'"< r, < rb - @f  ++(I -8)/2 - F:d  and attracts no e types 
Vertical dominance 0)  this is when A  attracts the entire  occurs if ;Id < ra < zd, 
market for the 0 types (first inequality) and has a zero market share for the e types (second 
inequality). 
Horizontal dominance (HD) occurs if zd< ra < ?Idd, this is when A  attracts for the 0 
types a strict p_ositive market share (first inequality) while it  does not  serve the entire 
market for the 0 types (second inequality). 
If r,  is "high", A attracts the entire market for 8 types (r,  2  ;Id)and serves at least some 
- 0 types (r,  2  2d). The demand A faces becomes 
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APPENDIX 3 
Equilibrium subgame (T,, Tb) 
We will proceed as follows. First, it is shown that there is only an equilibrium if ra E Di 
and rb  E 1 -D:.  Second, the equilibrium is computed and characterized. 
a)  There exists no equilibrium for ra E q  and rb  E 1 -@ and its symmetric ra E 
and rb E 1 -D;f. 
Necessary conditions to have a maximum for ra E q and rb  E 1 -@ are respectively 
anb 
(6)  -=  2(ra -2rb  -R)h  - (29 -2ra +  t(B-28 +  I)) =  o  - arb 
A necessary is that (5)=(6)iff 
Since ra E [p, Fa], the LHS of (7)is negative while the RHS of (7)is positive yielding a 
contradiction. 
By symmetry, there cannot be an equilibrium for ra E q  and rb  E 1 -q. 
b)  The fast order conditions for profit maximization on 2 and 1 -D:  have the following 
solution: $ =  R -
t(e -8)  . The equilibrium exists iff na(r,", 6)2  na(ra,  6)  and 
in(;) 2 
nb(e,  6)  2  nb(rZf,  ~b). 
i) The profit function is concave for ra E [%, rZfax] since demand is concave for those 





ii)  If  ra~[r$",Fa], the  derivative  of  the  profit  function  is  negative  if 

If ra E [c,  =  a)Fa.(aE  [0,  11).  Fa], then ra  up  +  (1 -
The FOC for ra then equals 
(8-e)(l -U)W 
ln (-) 1-0 with w =  . 
1-6 
If (4) < 0 for all a E  [0,11  then A's  best reply is not in [p, Fa]. Notice that if a =  0,  (4) 
becomes 2(1 -8)d/[2(8- l)w -(8-e)] < 0 and if a = 1,(4)=  0. If a(4)/aa 2  0 for 
all a E  [0,11 then (4) < 0. 
!@  0 iff 2[a(8-8)+  8 - 1][2u(B-W  - 1 +  28 -42  au 

+3@ -8)[a@-8)+  8 - l]w(fj- a 0 
Expression (5) reaches  its minimum for a*  =  [3(8-8) +  2@ -88 +  6)2]/(82(8-8)). 
Hence, if at a*, a(4)/aa 2  0,  then itjs positiye for all a. Plugging a*  into (5)yields the 
following condition ln((1-@/(I -6)) < 7(6-8)/(2(1-8)) which is always llfilled 
if 8 < 0.965. 
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Now, (i) and (ii) imply that the profit function has a global maximum in the interior of 
D:  if a < 0.965. By symmetry, the same analysis holds for nb(e, 6)2 I'Ib(e,  rb). 
APPENDIX 4 
Proof  of  Proposition I 
The proof  will proceed as follows. First, we  show that the profit  functions are quasi- 
concave and continuous in their own interest rate. Second, the equilibrium is characterized 
for r,  E  d,  and rb  c 1 -D:. 
a) Let's focus on the profit function of bank A when VD occurs. The demand function for 
segments D:  and e  is concave implying a concave profit function in r,.  The demand 
function described by  segment @ is convex  in r,.  Since dx;/ar;t  < 0 and the RHS 
derivative at r"'& equals zero, i3~c:/ar,  =0 has at most one solution on the segment @. 
Notice that atatd,  the LHS and RHS derivative are equal. 
Combining the concavity of za on d,  and e, the fact that a?l,/ar,  equals zero at c'n 
and  and the results from segment @, we obtain that n,  is quasi-concave inr,.  Since 
the profit  function is  continuous and  quasi-concave, n,  has a unique  maximum with 
respect to r,. 
The  same  kind  of  reasoning  applies for nb.  Hence  the  subgame possesses a Pure 
Strategy Nash Equilibrium (Dasgupta and Maskin [1986]). 
b)  The  appropriate demand  functions  are  given  by  D2d and  1 -D;fYd.  The FOC 
for  maximizing  the  profit  functions  have  a  unique  solution  given  by  rid  and  rvd 
' These deposit rates are equilibrium deposit rates iff  rid E [F'ld(rld),  ed(r;ld)] and rb  E 
[FV~  (rid)]. First-rld  30)]+ (r,vyd1,  2  F'id(rld) and  rvd < ed(rvd)  hold  if  0 2  [2f  (4 -
t(5 -so)], -t(4 - @ -0)  holds.  Second,  rj  6 ld(r2) and  rid 2  iid(r:d)  hold  if 
0 < [2f  (4 -38) -t]z -t(4 - @ -0) holds. This completes the proof. 
APPENDIX 5 
Proof  of  Proposition 2 
Similarly as for the vertical dominance case, we  can show that profit functions are quasi- 
concave. Then, ed and ddare the equilibrium interest rates if ed5 [y(dd),  F'id(dd)]  and 
rbhd E [ed(+),  ild(ed)  iff  0 2 [2f  (4 -38) -t]q -(0 -@(4f  +t)  and 
0 < [2f  (4 -30k) +t(5 -38)lq -(8 -8)(4f  +t) hold. 
APPENDIX 6 
Proof  of  Proposition 3 
Notice that &(Ta, Nb) =n,(N,,  Nb) iff tl =~(t) and nb(Ta,  Nb) = xb(Ta,  Tb) iff tl =B(t). 
In addition, notice that ~(t)  < E(t). Hence, 
a)  (N,, Nb) in equilibrium iff  6 g(t). 
b)  (T,, Nb)  in equilibrium if g(t) <f < E(t). 
C) (T,,  Tb)  in equilibrium iff  3 t(t). 
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APPENDIX 7 
Proof of Proposition  4 
(N,, Nb) is never an equilibrium since rEd  <  and xid 3 e.(Ta,  Tb) is an equilibrium 
iff  nb(Ta,  Nb) < nb(Ta,  Tb).  This  inequality  cannot  be  solved,  yielding  an  implicit 
inequality. However, since hb(Ta,  Nb)/af  0 and anb(Ta,  Tb)/af =  0, we can conclude 
that for higher values off (given t), (To,  Nb) will be the SPNE. 
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